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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES - POSSIBILITY OF VIOLATION AND EFFECT OF
LIMNITATION - VALIDITY OF LEASEHOLD ESTATE TO COMMENCE ON COMPLE-
TION OF BUILDING. - The Board of Port Commissioners of the city of
Oakland, acting on behalf of the city, awarded a ten-year lease of certain
property to one Goodman. The lease was to commence on the city's com-
pletion of a convention hall. Plaintiff, a city taxpayer, brought an action
to restrain the Board from proceeding with the construction and the lease.
The District Court of Appeal held, one justice dissenting, that even though
the lessor was to construct the building with due diligence, the lessee's interest
in the lease was not in its inception vested, and the lease was violative of
the rule against perpetuities. Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 326 P.2d 957
(Cal. 1958).
The rule against perpetuities, a rule of law and not one of construction,'
is applicable to equitable as well as to legal interests.2 It is directed against
remoteness of vesting and is concerned only with the commencement of
estates,3 and not against postponement of possession and enjoyment. 4 In
determining the question of remoteness regard must be had to possible, and
not merely actual events. 5 When lives form no part of the postponed period,
the estate must vest within twenty-one years. 6
Generally, all jurisdictions where the rule is in effect apply a strict con-
struction and declare void any interest that possibly may not vest within the
prescribed time.7 The decision in the principal case is in accord with the view
of strict construction, even though the event is to occur with due diligence.
Such a construction makes the rule more definite and tends to create uniform-
ity. However, the dissenting justice contended that "due diligence" meant
that the building was to be constructed within a reasonable time and that
the lease would vest or fail within the prescribed period. His view would
appear to have some support by a few decisions where the contingency was
to occur within a reasonable time, or where a reasonable time appeared to be
necessarily less than twenty one years.8 This would be a relaxation of the rule
which could lead to confusion and uncertainty. What may be reasonable
1. Smith v. Renne, 382 Ill. 26, 46 N.E.2d 587 (1943); Johnson v. Cosby, 374 Ill.
407, 29 N.E.2d 608 (1940); Thomas v. Pullman Trust & Savings Bank, 371 Ill. 577,
21 N.E.2d 897 (1939).
2. Beverlin v. First Nat'l Bank, 151 Kan. 307, 98 P.2d 200 (1940).
3. Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914); Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me.
541, 50 Atl. 898 (1901).
4. Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Scott, 121 N. J. 366, 189 Atl. 653 (1937).
5. Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co., 188 Md. 178, 52 A.2d 100 (1947). An excep-
tion is a gift over from one charity to another charity. Dickenson v. City of Anna, 310
Ill. 222, 141 N.E. 754 (1923); Storrs Agricultural School v. Whitney, 54 Conn., 342,
8 Atl. 141 (1887).
6. Smith v. Renne, supra note 1.
7. See e.g., Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136 (1951); In re
Sahlender's Estate, 89 Cal. App.2d 329, 201 P.2d 69 (1948); Reese v. Reese, 190 Md.
311, 58 A.2d 643 (1948). Contra, Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 Ad. 585 (1885)
(gift to take effect fourteen years after settlement of estate held valid.. The court said
that it was not to be presumed that the settlement of the estate will be delayed more
than seven years.). This case was criticized in Gray, Rule Against. Perpetuities § 214c
(3d ed. 1915).
8. See Plummer v. Brown, 315 Mo. 627, 287 S.W. 316 (1926) (trustees weie to sell
and distribute trust when it could be done to advantage and without injury to the estate
or beneficiaries); West Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Matlock, 212 S.W. 937 (Tex. Com.
App. 1919) (A trust was created to pay a bonus to the first railroad passing through
within a reasonable tine.); Brandenburg v. Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575
(1885) (trustees to make gift effective three years after wife's death, or at such time,




under one set of circumstances may not be reasonable under another. Thus,
disputes would be promoted and the result would be an increase in litiga-
tion. Therefore, if there is to be any revision of the rule it should be by
legislative action. The common law rule against perpetuities, without material
alteration, is in force in about two-thirds of the statesf California has adopted
by statute the rule already in existence by virtue of a constitutional provision.1 0
North Dakota has no statute against perpetuities, although there are statutory
restraints on alienation. There was some indication in In re Gray's Estate"
that the law in North Dakota included a rule against remoteness in vesting;
however, since the decision in Anderson v. Blixt,12 it is certain that no such
rule exists here.
JAKE C. HODNY
WRONGFUL DEATH - EFFECT OF LmITATION STATUTE - ACCRUAL OF
CAUSE OF ACTION. - In 1954 defendant forced plaintiff's car off the highway
killing plaintiff's wife and child. Defendant did not stop at the scene of the
accident, nor did he report the incident to authorities as required by statute.,
Plaintiff learned defendant's identity in 1956 and filed suit the same year.
Defendant pleaded the one year statute of limitations2 for wrongful death
actions. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the cause of action accrued
at the time of the death and was not tolled under the general statutory
provisions for fraudulent concealment or other improper acts.3: Frazee v. Part-
ney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
A cause of action for wrongful death is a statutory creation having its
origin in England in 1846.4 The first wrongful death statute in the United
States was passed by New York in 1847,5 and we now have similar enactments
in all the states.6
Every state has a time limitation for commencing action for wrongful death,
9. Smith, Real Property Survey, c. 9 h (10) (1956).
10. Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., 125 Cal. App.2d 222, 270 P.2d 604 (1954)
(Section 715.2 of the Civil Code, provides as follows: "No interest in real or personal
,property shall be good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest and any period of gestation involved
in the situation to which the limitation applies. ).
11. 27 N.D. 417, 146 N.W. 722 (1914).
12. 72 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1955) (The lease involved agricultural land with an
option to purchase, and' was to continue as long as any one of th I'sso-s was alive or
until the option was exercised. It was contended that § 47-1602 of the N. Dak. Rev. Code
(1943) was a rule against perpetuities, therefore the lease was invalid. The court held
that there was no statutory or common law rule against perpetuities in force in North
Dakota.).
1. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 564.450 (1949) (Provides no person involved in an accident
while operating a vehicle on a highway shall leave scene wthout stopping and giving
personal information to injured party or police officer.).
2. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.100 (1949) ("Every action . . . shall be commenced within
one year after the cause of action shall accrue . . .").
3. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.280 (1949) ("If any person, by absconding or concealing
himself, or by any other improper act, prevent the commencement of an action, such
action may be commenced within the time herein limited, after the commencement of
such action shall have ceased to' be so prevented.").
4. Lord Campbell's Act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
5. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1847, c. 450, §§ 1 & 2. See also Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed.
92 (2d Cir. 1921).
6. 11 Blashfield, Cyc. Auto Law & Pr. § 7412 (Penn. ed. 1936).
